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THE NEW ICE AGE: ADDRESSING THE
DEFICIENCIES IN ARKANSAS’S POSTHUMOUSLY
CONCEIVED CHILDREN STATUTE
Patrick Grecu
INTRODUCTION
The ability to conceive a child using the preserved genetic
material, or gametes, of a deceased person presents a number of
legal issues for inheritance, estate planning, Social Security, and
parental rights.1
New medical advancements in assisted
reproductive technology (ART) enable individuals to conceive
children after their death, complicating the conventional methods
of determining heirship of the decedent under state intestacy
laws.2 The purpose of intestacy law is to determine the succession
of a decedent that dies without a will, or intestate, with the goal
of carrying out the donative intent of the decedent.3 Intestacy law
has failed to keep pace with these technological advancements,
which has left the legal status of posthumously conceived
children (PCC) uncertain in many states.4
The increasing use of ART in human reproduction presents
a fundamental issue for the application of intestacy law. These
novel methods of reproduction could not be contemplated by
lawmakers in decades past, and as a result, the impact of ART on
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1. Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Dead Soldiers and Their Posthumously Conceived
Children, 31 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 74, 74 (2015).
2. Benjamin C. Carpenter, A Chip Off the Old Iceblock: How Cryopreservation Has
Changed Estate Law, Why Attempts to Address the Issue Have Fallen Short, and How to Fix
It, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 347, 349-50 (2011).
3. Jennifer Seidman, Functional Families and Dysfunctional Laws: Committed
Partners and Intestate Succession, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 211, 211 (2004).
4. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 350.
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inheritance law is unavoidable.5 The failure of many states’
intestacy laws to recognize PCC as rightful heirs eliminates the
child’s ability to inherit through intestacy or receive a class gift
through a will or trust.6 This problem has been the topic of legal
scholarship for over half a century, but the American legal system
has yet to reach a comprehensive and uniform solution.7
In addition, the significance of state intestacy law governing
PCC is often not realized until the family, on behalf of the child,
seeks to obtain benefits for the child or is denied benefits because
of the child’s legal status.8 For example, a child’s ability to
receive Social Security survivor’s benefits can depend upon the
child’s inheritance rights under state intestacy law.9 Similarly,
life insurance policies and retirement plans that lack a designated
beneficiary look to intestacy statutes to determine who receives
the plan proceeds.10 Considering that approximately fifty-eight
percent of Americans do not have a will, state intestacy law is
particularly important for PCC’s inheritance rights.11

5. Melissa B. Vegter, The “ART” of Inheritance: A Proposal for Legislation Requiring
Proof of Parental Intent Before Posthumously Conceived Children Can Inherit from a
Deceased Parent’s Estate, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 267, 272 (2003).
6. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 401.
7. Kristine S. Knaplund, Postmortem Conception and a Father’s Last Will, 46 ARIZ.
L. REV. 91, 92 (2004).
8. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 359.
9. Id. Consider this unfortunate and familiar story. Paula and John, a married couple,
learn that John has been diagnosed with cancer. Because chemotherapy treatments could
likely cause sterility, the couple decided to have a sample of John’s sperm preserved in case
they wanted to have children in the future. During this process, John provided legal consent
for his wife to use his preserved gametes to conceive a child. Eventually, John succumbed
to cancer despite his chemotherapy treatments. Nine months after John’s death, Paula
conceived a son with John’s frozen sperm using ART. Three months after her son was born,
Paula applied to the Social Security Administration for survivor’s benefits for her child, only
to be denied. Because state intestacy law did not address posthumously conceived children,
her son could not receive these benefits despite John’s lifelong contributions into Social
Security. This real-life account was taken from the Arkansas H.B 1904 Presentation to the
House Committee on Aging, Children and Youth, Legislative & Military Affairs on March
18, 2015. See To Permit a Child Conceived Through Assisted Reproduction After the Death
of a Parent to Inherit Real or Personal Property of the Parent that Died Intestate:
Presentation on HB 1904 Before the House Committee on Aging, Children and Youth,
Legislative & Military Affairs, 2015 Leg., 90th Gen. Assemb. (Ark. 2015),
[https://perma.cc/66UD-65WW] [hereinafter Presentation on HB 1904].
10. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 359.
11. Nick DiUlio, More Than Half of U.S. Adults Don’t Have a Will, New Survey
Reveals, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 17, 2017), [https://perma.cc/Q7DL-FP7S].
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Arkansas is among the minority that specifically addresses
the inheritance rights of PCC.12 The Arkansas statute, section 289-221, allows PCC to inherit if consent to the posthumous
conception is given by the decedent and the child is conceived
within twelve months following the parent’s death and born
within nineteen months after the death of the parent.13 This
consent must be in a writing that is “witnessed by a licensed
physician or a person acting under the supervision of a licensed
physician.”14
Although the current statute is laudable in that it confers
rights to PCC15, it presents a number of practical difficulties.
First, a parent must ostensibly seek out a medical professional in
order to provide consent to posthumously conceive.16 Second, the
statute’s time limitation contains conflicting language that creates
the potential for the surviving spouse to meet the time limit for
conceiving the child but not satisfy the time limit for the birth of
the child.17 Under the current law, a child could be conceived
within twelve months after the death of a spouse and yet still fall
outside the time limit of nineteen months for the birth of the child
in a typical nine-month pregnancy.18 Third, the statute lacks a
requirement to provide notice to the deceased’s estate that the
surviving parent plans to use the decedent’s gametes for
posthumous reproduction.19 Lastly, the statute is unclear whether
it applies only to married parents.20 Accordingly, the statute
should be amended to relax and simplify the consent requirement,
increase the time limitation for conception to three years, add a
notice requirement, and apply equally regardless of the parents’
marital status or sex of the surviving parent.
This Note addresses the Arkansas statute that regulates the
inheritance rights of PCC in Arkansas. Part I explains the issues
posed by posthumous conception and the technologies that make
12. See Cassandra M. Ramey, Inheritance Rights of Posthumously Conceived
Children: A Plan for Nevada, 17 NEV. L.J. 773, 782 (2017).
13. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221 (2015).
14. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221.
15. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221.
16. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221.
17. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221.
18. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221.
19. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221.
20. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221.
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posthumous conception possible. Part II discusses the current
legal approaches to granting inheritance rights to PCC, the policy
issues that must be considered, and approaches offered by model
laws, state statutes, and notable judicial decisions. Part III
examines the current Arkansas statute, section 28-9-221, which
governs PCC’s intestate rights and proposes new statutory
language to address its shortcomings.
I. INHERITANCE AND THE PREDICAMENT OF
POSTHUMOUS CONCEPTION
The process for determining a person’s heirs has remained
largely the same until the advent of medical technology that
makes it possible for individuals to conceive after their death.21
This technology has created uncertainty concerning how a child
can receive property through a testamentary instrument, intestate
succession, and through non-probate methods such as a trust or
life insurance policy.22
When a parent dies without a valid will, the rules of intestate
succession determine the inheritance rights of the deceased’s
children.23 Traditional parentage and inheritance laws do not
contemplate the possibility of posthumous conception, generally
limiting inheritance rights to children born during marriage or
within 300 days after the death of the father.24
Importantly, whether a posthumously conceived child has
inheritance rights depends upon the state of residency, and
approximately half of the states have not addressed whether PCC
have an interest in a deceased parent’s estate.25 Because of this,
PCC are often denied inheritance rights despite having a genetic
connection to the deceased parent. 26 This uncertain area of the
law is likely to become more complex as new technologies allow
for novel methods of human reproduction.27
21. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 347.
22. Id.; Vegter, supra note 5, at 272.
23. Id.
24. ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 108
(Rachel E. Berkhow et al. eds., 10th ed. 2017).
25. David Shayne, Posthumously Conceived Child as Heir Depends on Where, 42 EST.
PLAN. 28, 28 (2015).
26. Id.
27. See Sonia Azad, Same-Sex Couple Carries Same ‘Miracle’ Baby in What May Be
Fertility World First, USA TODAY (Oct. 29, 2018), [https://perma.cc/28YW-7ZEK].
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A. The Complications of Posthumous Conception
A posthumous child “is conceived before, but born after, his
father’s death.”28 Under the common law tradition, children born
out of wedlock, or after the death of the father, were considered
the child of no one and could not inherit from either parent.29 As
social norms have evolved with societal changes, all states now
recognize a posthumous child’s right to inherit and grant
posthumous children the same legal status of a child born during
the lifetime of the decedent.30 Although all provide that the child
can inherit from the mother, states vary how they permit
inheritance from the father.31
However, a posthumously conceived child, one not just born
but conceived after a parent’s death, often faces difficulties not
encountered by a traditionally conceived child.32 PCC are often
born into a legal vacuum.33 A posthumously conceived child’s
uncertain status is a result of conventional laws that were enacted
long before posthumous conception was a reality.34 Presently,
approximately half of the states have considered the issue,35 while

28. SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 24, at 107.
29. Julie E. Goodwin, Not All Children Are Created Equal: A Proposal to Address
Equal Protection Inheritance Rights of Posthumously Conceived Children, 4 CONN. PUB.
INT. L.J. 234, 241 (2005).
30. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-210 (1969). The Uniform Parentage Act establishes a
rebuttable presumption that a child born to a woman with 300 days after the death of her
husband is the child of that husband. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(1)(B) (2017). The
presumptions of parentage are likely required to apply equally to men and women now that
same-sex couples can marry in all states. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204 cmt. (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 2017).
31. Allison Stewart Ellis, Inheritance Rights of Posthumously Conceived Children in
Texas, 43 ST. MARY’S L.J. 413, 419 (2012); SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 24, at 109
(noting that most states allow paternity to be established through “evidence of the subsequent
marriage of the parents, acknowledgment by the father, an adjudication during the life of the
father, or clear and convincing proof after his death”). With the widespread availability of
reliable DNA paternity tests, the modern trend is moving towards allowing posthumous
proof of paternity by DNA evidence. SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 24, at 109.
32. Ellis, supra note 31, at 450-51.
33. Gloria J. Banks, Traditional Concepts and Nontraditional Conceptions: Social
Security Survivor’s Benefits for Posthumously Conceived Children, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
251, 264 (1999).
34. Brianne M. Star, A Matter of Life and Death: Posthumous Conception, 64 LA. L.
REV. 613, 615 (2004).
35. Shayne, supra note 25, at 28.
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the remaining state legislatures and the District of Columbia have
yet to enact statutes that address the legal status of PCC.36
State intestacy laws are particularly consequential for Social
Security benefits. The Social Security Administration (SSA)
provides benefits to a child of an individual that qualifies for
Social Security survivor’s benefits.37 The SSA requires that the
child be under eighteen years of age and a dependent at the time
of the parent’s death.38 However, a child that can inherit under
state intestacy law is presumed to be a dependent child that is
eligible to receive survivor’s benefits.39 These survivor’s benefits
can be valuable to a family that loses a parent. A child receiving
these benefits can get up to seventy-five percent of the deceased
parent’s benefit, or up to fifty percent if other family members
also receive benefits.40 In 2017, the average benefit provided to
children of deceased workers was $856.00 per month.41 This can
provide valuable assistance to families that lose a wage earner.
B. An Overview of Assisted Reproductive Technology
Recent advances in medical science now enable a person
suffering from infertility to conceive a child when he or she would
otherwise be unable.42 “Assisted reproduction is generally
defined as any technique,” other than sexual intercourse, “used to
conceive a child.”43 As the stigma surrounding assisted
reproduction fades, these medical technologies are becoming
more popular. To illustrate, there were 72,913 babies born in the
United States in 2015 using ART, an increase from 54,656 babies

36. Id. at 32. Two of these states, Massachusetts and New Jersey, have relied upon
case law to grant inheritance rights to posthumously conceived children.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (2015); see also Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 497-98
(1976).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1).
39. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.355 (1998) (“To decide whether you have inheritance rights
as the natural child of the insured, we use the law on inheritance rights that the State courts
would use to decide whether you could inherit a child’s share of the insured’s personal
property if the insured were to die without leaving a will.”); 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (2004).
40. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., BENEFITS FOR CHILDREN 2 (2018), [https://perma.cc/RH6YXLDW].
41. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., ANN. STAT. SUPPLEMENT TO THE SOC. SEC. BULL., 2018,
tbl.6.D5 (2019), [https://perma.cc/CXP9-QQBB].
42. See Carpenter, supra note 2, at 355.
43. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 352.
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born in 2006.44 The following section summarizes the primary
methods of ART and why some parents might use assisted
reproduction to posthumously conceive a child.
1. Assisted Reproductive Technology Methods
ART includes medical procedures that intend to achieve
pregnancy through methods other than coitus and are primarily
used as fertility treatments for people that have difficulty
conceiving a child.45 There are two categories of ART
procedures: internal fertilization and external fertilization.46
Internal fertilization methods place the sperm and egg, or
gametes, within the woman’s uterus who is to become pregnant.47
These procedures include Artificial Insemination (AI) and
Gamete Intrafallopian Transfer (GIFT).48 AI “occurs when sperm
is placed through artificial means into a woman’s uterus to
facilitate fertilization.”49 In a GIFT procedure, a woman’s eggs
are retrieved from her ovaries, mixed with sperm, and
subsequently placed in the woman to be naturally fertilized.50
In contrast, external fertilization occurs when the gametes
are extracted and combined to achieve fertilization of the egg
outside of the mother’s body.51 External fertilization procedures
combine the male and female gametes in a laboratory procedure
and then insert the fertilized egg, or embryo, into the woman’s

44. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2015 ASSISTED REPROD. TECH.:
NAT’L SUMMARY REP. 3, 50 (2017), [https://perma.cc/6TS4-3DJE].
45. NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART),
[https://perma.cc/E8FU-XNDX] (last visited Sept. 9, 2019).
46. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §
14.8 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
47. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §
14.8 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
48. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §
14.8 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
49. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 352-53.
50. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §
14.8 cmt. b; Jeffery Walters, Thawing the Inheritance Rights of Maybe Babies: An Answer
to Indiana’s Statutory Silence on Posthumously Conceived Children, 48 VAL. U. L. REV.
1229, 1236 (2014).
51. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §
14.8 cmt. b.
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uterus.52 This category of ART is often referred to as In Vitro
Fertilization (IVF) and is by far the most common and effective
form of ART.53 The IVF procedure can use the mother’s eggs or
a donor’s eggs to produce a pregnancy.54
The driving force behind these technologies is
cryopreservation.55 The process of cryopreservation uses very
low temperatures to preserve reproductive materials for later
use.56 This procedure maintains the viability of the preserved
gametes for decades and creates the ability to conceive children
long after a person’s death.57 The ability to maintain the viability
of genetic material for an extended period of time has
dramatically altered the possibilities for ART.58
Lastly, surrogacy provides another method of utilizing ART
to conceive a child. This involves an agreement in which a
woman, impregnated through an IVF procedure, carries a child to
birth for the intended parent or parents.59
2. Why Posthumous Conception?
Although the reasons why couples look to ART to achieve
pregnancy during their lifetime are obvious, why an individual
would use their deceased partner’s genetic material to conceive a
child is less evident. 60 However, there are myriad reasons why a
52. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §
14.8 cmt. b.
53. See SOC’Y FOR ASSISTED REPROD. TECH., Assisted Reproductive Technologies,
[https://perma.cc/GRF6-KGKX] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §
14.8 cmt. b.
55. Walters, supra note 50, at 1234-35.
56. Id.
57. Susan L. Barrett & Teresa K. Woodruff, Gamete Preservation, NAT’L INST. OF
HEALTH (May 3, 2011), [https://perma.cc/ZE7F-WLU2]. A famous example of the viability
of decades-old preserved genetic material is the case of a couple that had a daughter using
the father’s sperm that was preserved for twenty-two years. Kate Snow et al., Frozen Sperm
Still Viable Decades Later, ABC NEWS (Apr. 10, 2009), [https://perma.cc/5X5Y-UWWH].
In 2017, a child was born using an embryo preserved for twenty-four years. Sarah Zhang, A
Woman Gave Birth from an Embryo Frozen for 24 Years, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 21, 2017),
[https://perma.cc/V357-R6GN].
58. See, e.g., Zhang, supra note 57.
59. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 354. The legal ramifications of surrogacy on the
inheritance rights of a posthumously conceived child vary greatly by state and are beyond
the scope of this Note.
60. Id. at 358.
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partner would want to conceive his or her deceased partner’s
child.61 A person may want to use a loved one’s gametes as a
tribute to their deceased partner.62 Others may use the deceased’s
preserved genetic material for religious reasons to avoid using
donated sperm to conceive.63 Also, a person may want to have a
child that is a direct descendent of both parents to know the
genetic origins of the child.64
Furthermore, financial incentives may lead a surviving
partner to use a deceased partner’s gametes.65 The cost of
conceiving a child using ART is substantial, and the expense is
dramatically reduced if the surviving partner uses the preserved
genetic material of the deceased partner.66 In addition, this
method may allow the child to inherit from the decedent or other
family members, to be eligible to become a beneficiary of a trust,
or to qualify for Social Security survivor’s benefits.67
II. CURRENT LEGAL APPROACHES TO
POSTHUMOUSLY CONCEIVED CHILDREN
A notable shortcoming of modern probate law is the lack of
certainty in the inheritance rights of children outside of the
traditional nuclear family.68 The inheritance rights of an
individual are determined by the laws of the state in which they
are domiciled at his or her death.69 These state intestacy statutes
are the default rules for disposing of probate property of a
decedent who dies without a will.70 Many state intestacy statutes
enacted well before the advent of new reproductive technologies
do not address the inheritance rights of PCC.71

61. Id.
62. Kristine S. Knaplund, Legal Issues of Maternity and Inheritance for the Biotech
Child of the 21st Century, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 393, 398 (2008).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 399; Carpenter, supra note 2, at 358.
65. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 359.
66. Knaplund, supra note 62, at 399-400.
67. Id. at 398, 400-01.
68. Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the Nontraditional Family, 1996
UTAH L. REV. 93, 94.
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 260 (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
70. SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 24, at 63.
71. Shayne, supra note 25, at 28.

640

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 72:3

Legislatures must consider a number of policy issues when
drafting legislation affecting PCC.72 Broadly speaking, these key
interests include the efficient administration of estates, the intent
of the decedent, and the best interests of the child.73 The drafters
of the uniform laws have attempted to balance these interests in
creating model codes that provide inheritance rights to PCC. An
increasing number of states have addressed the issue, often
relying on the guidance of the model laws.74 In a small number
of states, case law still governs the legal status of PCC.75
A. Policy Issues in Determining the Inheritance Rights of
Posthumously Conceived Children
As the use of ART becomes more common, state legislatures
in the United States are charged with determining the best
approach to address the issues presented by the increased use of
ART and the possibility of posthumous conception. States
promulgate the rules that govern the probate of testamentary
instruments and the distribution of estates with the purpose to
carry out the likely intent of the decedent.76 To achieve that end,
state legislatures must consider key issues: (1) whether consent
of the deceased parent is required; (2) if notice of intent to use
decedent’s gametes for posthumous reproduction is needed; (3)
what time constraints are appropriate; (4) the parents’ marital
status and sex of the surviving parent; and (5) the best interests of
the child.77
1. Consent
An essential matter that states must consider is whether a
deceased parent must give consent for the posthumous use of his
or her preserved genetic material to conceive a child.78 Requiring
72. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 417.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-19
(2009).
75. See infra Part II.D.
76. Vegter, supra note 5, at 299.
77. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 404; Star, supra note 34, at 626-29.
78. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 418; Browne C. Lewis, Dead Men Reproducing:
Responding to the Existence of Afterdeath Children, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 403, 427-34
(2009).
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the decedent to give consent for posthumous reproduction aligns
with the goal of intestacy law, which seeks to fulfill the intent of
the deceased.79 If consent is necessary, it is important to
determine the methods of providing consent under the statute,
while still carrying out the intent of the deceased. 80 To date, the
legislatures that have granted inheritance rights to PCC have
overwhelmingly required the consent of the decedent.81 Yet
states vary as to how the consent requirement may be met and
what degree of specificity is required.82
In addition, legislatures must also consider the impact of a
divorce upon the prior consent given by the former spouse.
Allowing an ex-spouse to use a former partner’s preserved
genetic material to conceive a child after his or her death would
likely undermine the wishes of the divorced decedent.83 To avoid
such a result, some states have provided for automatic revocation
of a spouse’s consent to posthumous conception in the event of
divorce.84
2. Notice
Second, legislatures must determine whether the “surviving
spouse or partner must give notice” within a specified time to the
administrator or executor of the decedent’s estate of his or her

79. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 370; Vegter, supra note 5, at 299.
80. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 420.
81. Id. at 418. Although states addressing this issue have required consent for
posthumously children to fall within the ambit of their statutes, some scholars argue for a
less restrictive approach. See Shelly Simana, Creating Life After Death: Should Posthumous
Reproduction Be Legally Permissible Without the Deceased’s Prior Consent?, 5 J. L. &
BIOSCIENCES 329, 354 (2018) (arguing that “posthumous reproduction should be legally
permitted, even in the absence of the deceased’s prior consent, and [] the default position
should be to presume that the deceased consented to posthumous reproduction, unless he or
she previously objected to it or there are strong indications ([e.g.] religious beliefs or values)
that the person would not have agreed”).
82. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-19 (2009)
(requiring consent “in a record”); CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5 (2005) (requiring consent in
writing that specifies decedent’s genetic material shall be used for posthumous conception
that must be signed and dated and designate a person to control the use of the decedent’s
gametes); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221 (2015) (requiring the decedent consent in “writing
that is either notarized or witnessed by a licensed physician or a person acting under the
supervision of a licensed physician”).
83. Ellis, supra note 31, at 439.
84. Id.
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intent to use the decedent’s gametes to conceive a child.85 A
notice requirement is advantageous in that it serves to protect the
fiduciary from liability if future claims are made on the estate and
to protect the beneficiaries that receive property from liability of
future claims to the devised assets.86
3. Time Constraints
Third, state legislatures must consider whether a child
conceived after the death of a parent must be in utero or born
within a definite time period after the decedent’s death.87
Providing a time limitation allows for the efficient administration
of a decedent’s estate.88 Additionally, a time limitation provides
finality to estate administration and protects “fiduciaries who may
distribute assets while unaware that the decedent left preserved
genetic material.”89 States commonly provide time constraints
for when the child must be born,90 in gestation,91 or both.92 Some
states provide a time limitation of three years,93 while other states
are more restrictive.94
Although it is important to provide finality in estate
administration, statutes that offer a generous time limitation allow
the surviving spouse time to reflect on the choice to pursue a
pregnancy with ART while also supplying certainty in the
administration of the decedent’s estate.95 Furthermore, a time
constraint of two or three years allows the surviving parent to
achieve a successful pregnancy with ART if the initial attempt is
unsuccessful.96

85. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 423.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 424-26.
88. Id. at 425.
89. Id.
90. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1(A) (2003).
91. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5(c) (2005).
92. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-120(11) (2010); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-0419(11) (2009).
93. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-19(11).
94. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221(a) (2015).
95. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 425.
96. Id.
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4. Marital Status and Sex of the Parent
Fourth, states must consider whether to make marriage a
prerequisite for a posthumously conceived child to inherit,97 and
whether the statute applies equally to men and women.98 Many
states have restricted inheritance rights of PCC to those born to
parents married at the time of death.99 Likewise, states must
decide how intestacy law will apply in situations where a woman
dies before a spouse and intends her preserved gametes to be used
for posthumous conception.100 These are major issues to
examine, as legislatures that restrict inheritance rights of PCC to
children born to married parents may violate the Equal Protection
Clause. 101 State restrictions that restrict the ability of PCC to
inherit through intestacy law must be substantially related to
important state interests.102 Allowing differential treatment of
similarly situated children based on the parents’ marital status to
preclude children born to unmarried couples from inheriting is
unlikely to survive constitutional challenges.103 In addition,
restricting a posthumously conceived child’s inheritance rights
based on the sex of the parent could also be similarly
unconstitutional.104

97. Star, supra note 34, at 639.
98. Knaplund, supra note 62, at 412.
99. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221; IOWA CODE § 633.220A (2011); LA. STAT.
ANN. § 9:391.1 (2003).
100. Knaplund, supra note 62, at 412.
101. See Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 566 U.S. 541, 557 (2012); Carpenter, supra
note 2, at 427; Goodwin, supra note 29, at 271 (noting that PCC are “non-marital children”
because the death of a spouse ends a marriage and intestacy laws that “categorically deny”
all PCC from inheriting would violate the Equal Protection Clause under intermediate
scrutiny).
102. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (opining that classifications
based on legitimacy are subject to intermediate scrutiny); Carpenter, supra note 2, at 427.
103. See Astrue, 566 U.S. at 556; Clark, 486 U.S. at 461; Carpenter, supra note 2, at
427.
104. Linda Kelly Hill, Equal Protection Misapplied: The Politics of Gender and
Legitimacy and the Denial of Inheritance, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 129, 140 (2006).
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5. Best Interests of the Child
Lastly, state legislatures must consider the child’s best
interests. A child has the right to parental financial support.105
Allowing PCC to receive government benefits in the same
manner as traditionally conceived children provides uniformity
and fairness in the distribution of public resources. 106 The
purpose of the Social Security provision for survivor’s benefits is
to give support to dependents that have lost a wage earner.107 In
this light, the same opportunity to receive these entitlements
should apply equally to traditionally conceived children and those
conceived using ART. Placing an outright ban on a posthumously
conceived child’s ability to inherit or receive government benefits
would be against the child’s best interests and counter to public
policy to provide for children “as completely as possible.” 108 A
child born through untraditional methods should not be punished
for the reproductive choices of his or her parents.
B. The Proposed Laws Addressing Posthumously Conceived
Children
A number of uniform model codes address the inheritance
rights of PCC,109 yet they take widely different approaches.
Specifically, the model laws vary significantly in how consent of
the deceased parent may be established and the duration of the
time restrictions.110 Despite the guidance provided by these
codes, presently only half of the state legislatures have
promulgated laws addressing the rights of PCC.111 The remaining
105. See Vegter, supra note 5, at 292-93; Woodward v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d
257, 265 (Mass. 2002).
106. Vegter, supra note 5, at 293.
107. Susan E. Satava, Discrimination Against the Unacknowledged Illegitimate Child
and the Wrongful Death Statute, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 933, 984 (1996). Providing Social
Security survivor’s benefits for posthumously conceived children is especially
consequential. Child poverty rates vary substantially with respect to marital status. See U.S.
DEP’T OF COM., INCOME & POVERTY IN THE U.S.: 2017 13 (2018), [https://perma.cc/R4S5DLJT]. The child poverty rate in a married-couple family is 8.4%, compared with a rate of
40.8% for children living only with their mother and 19.1% for children living only with
their father. Id.
108. Vegter, supra note 5, at 293.
109. Goodwin, supra note 29, at 255.
110. See id. at 255-59.
111. Shayne, supra note 25, at 28.
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states have left it to the courts to interpret their intestacy laws to
determine the legal status of PCC.112
1. The Uniform Probate Code
The Uniform Probate Code (UPC) provides that a
posthumously conceived child may inherit through intestate
succession and class gifts, subject to certain conditions.113 If two
conditions are met, the UPC considers a child conceived after a
parent’s death a child of the deceased parent.114 First, the
deceased parent must have “signed a record that, considering all
the facts and circumstances, evidences the individual’s
consent”115 or “intended to function as a parent of the child.”116
This intent can be established by clear and convincing
evidence.117 Second, the posthumously conceived child must be
“in utero not later than 36 months after the individual’s death”118
or “born not later than 45 months after the individual’s death.”119
2. The Uniform Parentage Act
The Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) addresses the parental
status of a deceased parent.120 If two requirements are met, the
decedent may be deemed the parent of the posthumously
conceived child.121 First, the deceased individual must have
“consented in a record” to be the parent of the child “if assisted
reproduction were to occur after the” decedent’s death122 or the
deceased’s intent to be a parent of a posthumously conceived
child is established by clear and convincing evidence.123 Second,
the child must be “in utero not later than 36 months after the

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Goodwin, supra note 29, at 255.
Carpenter, supra note 2, at 372.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N amended 2010).
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f)(1).
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f)(2)(B).
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f)(2)(C).
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(k)(1).
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(k)(2).
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 708 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 708(b).
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 708(b)(1)(A).
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 708(b)(1)(B).
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individual’s death”124 or “born not later than 45 months after the
individual’s death.”125
3. Restatement (Third) of Property
The Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other
Donative Transfers suggests a much broader approach to
allowing PCC to inherit by intestate succession. 126 The drafters
take the position that for a child of ART to inherit from a deceased
parent the child “must be born within a reasonable time after the
decedent’s death in circumstances indicating that the decedent
would have approved of the child’s right to inherit.”127 It also
indicates that a “clear case” would be one in which a child was
born “by artificial insemination of the decedent’s widow with his
frozen sperm.”128
4. Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technologies
In 2008, the American Bar Association drafted the Model
Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology.129 This
model legislation adopts the view that a child conceived after a
parent’s death is recognized as a child of the deceased parent if
the individual consented “in a record that if assisted reproduction
were to occur after death, the deceased individual would be a
parent of the child.”130 Additionally, the Act indicates that the
consent must be “dated and signed by the [medical] provider and
124. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 708(b)(2)(A).
125. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 708(b)(2)(B).
126. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 2.5 cmt. l (AM. LAW INST. 1999).
127. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §
2.5 cmt. l. For class gift purposes, the Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other
Donative Transfers mirrors the UPC’s approach to posthumously conceived children,
requiring consent in “writing or other record . . . exhibiting intent, in light of all the facts and
circumstances, to be treated as the child’s other parent.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 14.8(2)(A). Absent a signed writing or record,
the child may inherit if the deceased parent either intended to function as a parent and was
prevented by death or intended to be treated as a parent of a posthumously conceived child,
“but only if that intent is established by clear and convincing evidence.” RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 14.8(2)(B)(ii)-(iii).
128. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §
2.5 cmt. l.
129. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2008).
130. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 607.
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the participant,”131 specify the parental rights of all
participants,132 and define the length of time that consent will
remain valid.133
C. Statutory Approaches
The following section outlines the approaches taken by state
legislatures in addressing the inheritance rights of PCC. A survey
of state intestacy laws reveals an unfortunate lack of uniformity.
Of the states that have taken up the issue, several states have
statutes that specifically include PCC when certain conditions are
met,134 while other states have explicitly excluded them from
inheriting from a deceased parent.135
1. States Including Posthumously Conceived Children
A minority of states have explicitly granted inheritance
rights to PCC.136 These states have attempted to “foster
individual procreative liberty” by relying on an “‘intent-based’
framework in addressing the legal status and rights of children
and progenitors involved in assisted reproduction.”137 In general,
the majority of states that recognize the parental relationships
between a deceased parent and a child conceived after the parent’s
death have placed limitations on the child’s ability to inherit. In

131. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 202(1)(b).
132. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 202(1)(c).
133. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 202(1)(e).
134. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106(8) (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-19(11)
(2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.077(4) (2016).
135. MINN. STAT. § 524.2-120(10) (2010); MO. REV. STAT. § 474.050 (1955); OHIO.
REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.14 (West 2019).
136. States that have enacted statutes that extend inheritance rights to children
conceived after the death of a parent include: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, New York, North Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and
Wyoming. See Kathryn McColl Sargent, Recent Connecticut Legislation on Inheritance
Rights of Children Conceived Posthumously Via In-Vitro Fertilization, 89 CONN. B.J. 149,
156-57 (2015); CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5 (2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106; CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 45a-785 (2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-707 (West 2019); FLA. STAT. §
742.17 (1993); IOWA CODE § 633.267 (2011); LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1 (2003); N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.3 (McKinney 2019); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-19; TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.707 (West 2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-707 (West 2019);
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26A.635 (2019); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-907 (West 2019).
137. Banks, supra note 33, at 292.
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addition, many state laws only apply to situations in which the
parents of the child were married.
Some states, such as Colorado and North Dakota, have relied
on the UPC for guidance.138 Colorado grants inheritance rights to
children conceived using ART after the death of a spouse if the
decedent “consented in a record that if assisted reproduction were
to occur after death, the deceased spouse would be a parent of the
child” but omits the time limitation.139 Similarly, North Dakota
also recognizes a parent-child relationship between a child
conceived after a parent’s death using assisted reproduction but
has adopted the more specific provisions of the UPC.140 The
statute follows the UPC’s consent requirement of a signed record
or clear and convincing evidence of the deceased’s intent along
with the time constraints that require the child to be in utero
within thirty-six months and born within forty-five months of the
parent’s death.141
Other state statutes also include a notice requirement.142 For
example, California’s statute grants inheritance rights to a child
conceived after the death of a parent if the child proves by clear
and convincing evidence that specific conditions are satisfied.143
Under California law, the decedent must have specified in writing
that his or her gametes were to be used for posthumous
conception.144 This writing must be signed and dated, designate
a person to control the use of the gametes, and can only be
revoked or amended in writing.145 In addition, notice that the
deceased’s genetic material is available for posthumous use must
be given to the executor or administrator of the decedent’s estate
within four months of the decedent’s death.146 Lastly, the child
must be “in utero within two years . . . of the decedent’s death.”147

138. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106; N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-19.
139. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106(8).
140. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-19(11) (West 2020).
141. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-19.
142. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5 (2005); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW
§ 4-1.3 (McKinney 2019).
143. CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5.
144. CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5(a).
145. CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5(a)(1)-(3).
146. CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5(b).
147. CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5(c).
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2. States Excluding Posthumously Conceived Children
In contrast, other states have chosen to specifically deny
inheritance rights to PCC.148 For instance, Georgia, Idaho,
Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, South Carolina, and South Dakota
are among the states that have excluded these children from
inheriting under their intestacy laws.149 These states rely on the
historical presumption that children not alive or in gestation at the
time of the parent’s death cannot inherit from the decedent.150
Not only are these children excluded from intestate inheritance,
but they are also unable to receive Social Security survivor’s
benefits from the deceased parent.151
In a significant number of states, the legal status of PCC has
yet to be addressed and remains unclear.152 Often, states have
overlooked how children born using ART do not fall within the
timeline of a typical conception and birth possible by sexual
intercourse.153 As a result, courts are forced to determine whether
a child conceived after a parent’s death falls within the language
of the state statutes that apply to children conceived before
death.154
D. Judicial Decisions
Many courts have been tasked with determining the legal
status of PCC by interpreting and applying traditional
posthumous children statutes. They are faced with ascertaining
the intent of the legislature and construing the language of the
statute to apply to nontraditional circumstances. Two influential
cases, In re Estate of Kolacy in New Jersey and Woodward v.
148. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 405
149. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-1(b)(1) (West 2019); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-108
(2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.2104 (2000); MINN. STAT. § 524.2-120 subdiv. 10 (2010);
MO. REV. STAT. § 474.050 (1955); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.14 (West 2019); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 62-2-108 (2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-108 (2007).
150. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 405
151. Id. at 415.
152. Id. at 403-04.
153. Ramey, supra note 12, at 778.
154. See In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1260 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000);
Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 264 (Mass. 2002); Khabbaz ex rel. Eng
v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 930 A.2d 1180, 1183-84 (N.H. 2007); Finley v. Astrue, 372
Ark. 103, 110, 270 S.W.3d 849, 853 (2008).
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Commissioner of Social Security in Massachusetts, allowed for
children born after the death of a parent to inherit from the
decedent.155 The court in In re Estate of Kolacy held that the
general intent of the statute should prevail over the plain language
that failed to contemplate new technologies.156 Similarly, the
court in Woodward established that PCC could inherit from a
deceased parent if certain circumstances are met.157
In contrast, in Khabbaz v. Commissioner, Social Security
Administration, the New Hampshire Supreme Court declined to
extend inheritance rights to PCC.158 The court contended that to
interpret the law to include children conceived after a parent’s
death would require it to “add words to [the] statute” and noted
that matters of public policy were best left to the legislature. 159
It appears that state intestacy law will continue to play a
major role in whether a posthumously conceived child qualifies
for Social Security benefits. Recently in Astrue v. Capato ex rel.
B.N.C., the United States Supreme Court unanimously upheld the
validity of the SSA’s use of state intestacy laws in determining a
child’s eligibility to receive Social Security survivor’s benefits.160
III. THE INHERITANCE RIGHTS OF POSTHUMOUSLY
CONCEIVED CHILDREN IN ARKANSAS
A. The History of Arkansas Case Law
In 2008, the Arkansas Supreme Court considered a question
of law certified to the Court by the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Arkansas.161 The case came before the
155. In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1263-64; Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 272.
156. In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1262.
157. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 272. The court determined that a child could inherit
from a deceased parent if (1) a genetic relationship with the deceased parent was established;
(2) the decedent consented before death to posthumous reproduction; and (3) the decedent
consented to support the child. Id. In addition, time limitation could bar a claim for
inheritance, and notice must be given to all interested parties in any action. Id.
158. In re Estate of Khabbaz, 930 A.2d at 1182. The court considered, “Is a child
conceived after her father’s death via artificial insemination eligible to inherit from her father
as his surviving issue under New Hampshire intestacy law?” Id.
159. Id. at 1186.
160. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 566 U.S. 541, 555-56 (2012).
161. Finley v. Astrue, 372 Ark. 103, 104, 270 S.W.3d 849, 850 (2008). The case was
delivered to the Arkansas Supreme Court by a certified question from the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. See Finley v. Astrue, 601 F. Supp. 2d
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District Court as an appeal by Amy Finley from the final decision
of the SSA which denied her posthumously conceived child’s
claim to survivor’s benefits.162 A child’s eligibility to receive
these benefits depends on whether they are considered an heir
under the state’s intestacy laws.163
In Finley v. Astrue, Ms. Finley and her husband pursued
fertility treatments during the marriage and decided to participate
in the IVF process.164 Initially, an IVF procedure failed to
produce a pregnancy from the implanted embryos.165 Mr. Finley
died intestate the month after the failed procedure.166 Less than
one year later, Ms. Finley became pregnant using the couple’s
preserved genetic material.167
The Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that the language of
the existing state statute addressing posthumous heirs as those
children “conceived before his or her death” means that only such
heirs could inherit under the law.168 Refusing to define the term
“conceive,” the Court rejected the argument that the child had
been conceived prior to the father’s death despite existing as a
fertilized embryo during the lifetime of the deceased father.169
The Court declined to construe the statute to include PCC in part
because the “General Assembly, in enacting . . . [the posthumous
descendants statute], did not intend for the statute to permit a
child, created through in vitro fertilization and implanted after the
father’s death, to inherit under intestate succession.”170 Despite
refusing to interpret the statute’s language to include PCC, the
Court noted: “The determination of public policy lies almost
exclusively with the legislature. . . . [W]e strongly encourage the
General Assembly to revisit the intestacy succession statutes to

1092, 1097-98 (E.D. Ark. 2009). For a detailed analysis of the Finley decision, see generally
Buckley W. Bridges, Statutory Misconception: The Arkansas Supreme Court’s Method in
Finley v. Astrue Sets New Precedent for Uncertainty, 63 ARK. L. REV. 419 (2010).
162. Finley, 372 Ark. at 105, 270 S.W.3d at 850.
163. 20 C.F.R. § 404.355(b)(1) (1998).
164. Finley, 372 Ark. at 105, 270 S.W.3d at 850.
165. Id. at 106, 270 S.W.3d at 850.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 106, 270 S.W.3d at 850-51.
168. Id. at 110, 270 S.W.3d at 853.
169. Finley, 372 Ark. at 111, 270 S.W.3d at 854.
170. Id. at 110, 270 S.W.3d at 853.
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address the issues involved in the instant case and those that have
not but will likely evolve.”171
B. The Legislature Takes Action
Six years after the Finley decision, the State Legislature took
up the challenge posed by the Arkansas Supreme Court. In 2015,
the General Assembly enacted section 28-9-221, addressing the
issue of PCC posed in Finley.172 The statute provides:
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any law to the
contrary, a child conceived after the death of a decedent who
specifically authorized the decedent’s surviving spouse, in a
writing that is either notarized or witnessed by a licensed
physician or a person acting under the supervision of a licensed
physician, to use the decedent’s gametes after the decedent’s
death shall be deemed the child of the decedent with the right to
inherit from the decedent if the child is conceived within twelve
(12) months following the death of the decedent and born within
nineteen (19) months following the death of the decedent.
(b) This section is retroactive to December 1, 2009, solely
for the purpose of establishing a posthumous child’s entitlement
to Social Security benefits under the federal Social Security Act,
42 U.S.C. § 402(d), deriving from the decedent.173
This statute is a significant step in recognizing parental
relationships and extending inheritance rights to children that are
born using ART after the death of a parent. However, this

171. Id. at 112, 270 S.W.3d at 855. Finley’s child was also denied Worker’s
Compensation benefits. See Finley v. Farm Cat, Inc., 103 Ark. App. 292, 296, 288 S.W.3d
685, 689 (2008).
172. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221 (2015). It should be noted that the Finley decision
itself was not the motivation for enacting the current law. The current statute was passed
after Paula Shelton, noted in the Introduction, supra, brought the issue to the attention of
Representative Warwick Sabin, the bill’s sponsor. See Presentation on HB 1904, supra note
9. The efforts of Representative Sabin to ensure that PCC have inheritance rights are
commendable. After investigating the legislative history of House Bill 1904, the most
vexatious shortcomings of the current statute were not present in the original bill presented
by Representative Sabin but appear to have been the result of amendments made in the
Senate. See S. Amendment No. 2 to H.B. 1904, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015)
(revising the time limitation for a parent to posthumously conceive a child from ten months
after the decedent’s death to twelve months but still retaining the remaining language that
required the child to be born nineteen months after the decedent’s death).
173. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221.
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positive advancement in granting PCC inheritance rights is not
without its problems.
C. The Quandary of Arkansas’s Posthumously Conceived
Children Statute
The current Arkansas statute addressing the intestate
inheritance of PCC presents a number of perplexing issues. First,
the consent requirement creates practical and legal difficulties by
seemingly requiring the involvement of medical professionals. 174
Second, the time limitation is restrictive, and the plain language
of the statute itself is conflicting.175 Third, the statute lacks any
requirement to give notice to the fiduciary of the decedent’s estate
of the possibility of posthumous conception.176 Finally, the
language of the statute appears to apply only to a child that is born
to parents that were married at the time of the deceased parent’s
death.177
1. Consent
The current statute requires that the decedent give consent to
the posthumous use of his or her genetic material for a
posthumously conceived child to be considered a legal child of
the decedent with the right to inherit from the deceased parent.178
Under the statute, a decedent manifests consent if the person
“specifically authorized the decedent’s surviving spouse” to use
his or her gametes “in a writing that is either notarized or
witnessed by a licensed physician or a person acting under the
supervision of a licensed physician.”179
This provision presents two issues. First, the language of the
statute itself creates ambiguity regarding the consent requirement.
The words indicating that the writing must be “either notarized or
witnessed by a licensed physician” or a person supervised by a

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221.
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221(a).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221.
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licensed physician presents unanswered questions.180 Is the
writing to be notarized or witnessed by a licensed physician or
supervised medical staff? Or does this present two different
options of giving legal consent by: (1) having the writing
notarized by a notary; or (2) witnessed by a licensed physician or
staff member? Unfortunately, the surrounding words of the
statute fail to resolve the ambiguity.
Second, the law requires a person to seek out a medical
professional to provide legal consent to allow a posthumously
conceived child to inherit.181 Although this could conceivably
streamline the process for providing consent through a
standardized procedure,182 this creates other concerns. The
statute ostensibly requires an individual intending to give legal
consent to posthumously conceive a child to seek out a medical
professional, instead of a lawyer.183 Although fertility clinics
require individuals to provide consent to perform assisted
reproduction procedures,184 deferring to the medical community
to fulfill statutory requirements in determining a child’s legal
status seems ill-advised. This unwieldy requirement places an
unnecessary burden on a parent that may wish for the surviving
parent to use his or her genetic material to have a child.
As an initial matter, the legislature should provide clarity for
what constitutes consent under the statute. The most expedient
approach would be to follow the guidance of the UPA and require
the decedent to consent in a record185 or allow the surviving
spouse to prove the decedent’s intent by clear and convincing
evidence.186 I argue that the consent requirement should be
simplified by allowing an individual to approve of the
posthumous use of his or her gametes without formalities that
may invalidate the decedent’s intent to posthumously conceive.
In addition, dispensing with the current language of the statute
would resolve the grammatical ambiguity present in the current
180. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221.
181. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221.
182. Ellis, supra note 31, at 436.
183. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221.
184. Debbie K. Lerner, New Reproductive Technology and Wisconsin Law: Fertility
Clinics Making Law, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 206, 214 (1991).
185. One example would be a fertility treatment facility consent form completed prior
to undergoing fertility procedures.
186. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 421.
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version and eliminate the involvement of medical professionals
in the consent process.
Lastly, the legislature should address the effect of a divorce
on the prior consent of a spouse. To carry out the likely intent of
the decedent, consent should be automatically revoked upon the
divorce of a married couple.187 This would eliminate the
possibility that the surviving ex-spouse could undermine the
intent of the deceased. Revoking prior consent of the deceased
parent would fall in line with other probate law, such as the rule
of automatically revoking will provisions devising property to a
spouse in the event of a divorce.188
2. Time Limitation
Perhaps the most unusual shortcoming is the time limitation
to conceive and give birth to a posthumous child after a parent’s
death. The statute provides that the child must be conceived
within twelve months after the spouse’s death and born within
nineteen months after the death of the parent.189 The plain
language of the statute creates an inconsistency that would allow
the surviving spouse to fulfill part of the requirement, yet not
satisfy the time of birth requirement. It could easily be
foreseeable that a child could be conceived with the decedent’s
gametes within twelve months following the death of the
decedent and yet still be in gestation beyond nineteen months
after the death given the typical nine-month gestation period.
Curiously, the statute fails to account for the usual duration of
pregnancy.190
In addition, the time limitation itself is restrictive, requiring
those who are grieving to make a very significant decision quickly
after losing a loved one. The current law requires a surviving
parent to decide to conceive a child within a few months after the
death of his or her spouse and then successfully achieve a
pregnancy with the decedent’s gametes using ART within twelve

187. This is in accord with the Uniform Parentage Act. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 706
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
188. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-109(b) (1979) (revoking all provisions in a will in
favor of the testator’s spouse in the event of divorce or annulment).
189. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221 (2015).
190. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221.
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months of the loss.191 This forces the person to make a
momentous life decision and plan for any complications that may
occur, such as the possibility of a failed ART procedure, nearly
immediately after the death of a loved one.
These issues must be addressed to provide clarity. First, the
legislature must resolve the conflicting language in the statute.
The current language that allows a child to inherit “if the child is
conceived within twelve (12) months following the death of the
decedent and born within nineteen (19) months following the
death of the decedent” creates an unresolvable conflict due to the
typical nine-month duration of pregnancy.192 It is imperative for
the law to establish readily identifiable time limitations to provide
certainty to families pursuing posthumous conception.
Second, the time limitation should be extended to permit the
posthumous child to be conceived within three years following
the decedent’s death, which aligns with the UPC’s approach.193
A longer time limitation accounts for a period of grieving and the
practical realities of using ART, which can often require multiple
attempts to achieve a pregnancy.194
3. Lack of Notice Requirement
Furthermore, the current statute does not require a person
intending to use the deceased gametes for posthumous
reproduction to give notice to the fiduciary of the decedent’s
estate. Although this is not essential, providing notice in writing
allows the fiduciary to protect assets in which the child has an
interest.195
To aid in the administration of estates, Arkansas should also
consider adding a notice element to the statute. A surviving
parent of the posthumously conceived child should provide notice
within six months to a fiduciary or custodian managing the
decedent’s assets that posthumous conception is a possibility.
This protects the fiduciary and the future child’s interest in the
decedent’s property. However, the failure to meet this procedural
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221.
See supra Part II.B.1.
Vegter, supra note 5, at 270.
Carpenter, supra note 2, at 423.
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requirement should not decide the child’s status as an heir of the
deceased parent. If the fiduciary is not given notice, the fiduciary
may distribute assets without liability after the six-month notice
period.196 The effect would be that the child would not receive
the property already distributed from the deceased parent’s estate
if notice is not provided yet would still qualify for Social Security
survivor’s benefits or other inheritance rights. This would serve
to protect the child’s interests while allowing for the timely
administration of the parent’s estate.197 Furthermore, if notice is
given to the fiduciary after the notice period, the fiduciary should
have a duty to retain any remaining assets to which the child may
have a claim until the end of the three-year time limitation.198
4. Marriage Requirement
Lastly, the statute may face constitutional challenges under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in
limiting inheritance rights based on the martial status of the
parents.199 In this case, the language of the current statute may
present an ambiguity with regard to the relationship status of the
parents of a posthumously conceived child. The term “decedent”
is used to refer to the deceased parent, but the word “spouse” is
used in reference to the “decedent’s surviving spouse.”200
Although not wholly evident from the words in the statute,
the discussion of the bill during the presentation to the Arkansas
House of Representatives Committee on House Aging, Children
and Youth, Legislative & Military Affairs indicates that the
statute was intended to apply to parents that are married at the
time of the death of the decedent.201 To ensure that the statute
applies equally to both married and unmarried parents, this
limiting language should be amended to remove the term
“spouse,” which bars PCC born to unmarried parents from
inheriting. By using consistent, inclusive language, the statute
can be uniformly applied in all PCC cases, regardless of marital
status or sex of the parent.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. at 424.
Id. at 422.
Id. at 424.
Id. at 427.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-221 (2015).
See Presentation on HB 1904, supra note 9.

658

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 72:3

D. Proposal to Amend Section 28-9-221
In response to the problems with Arkansas’s PCC statute
outlined above, I propose amending the statute to clarify the legal
status and inheritance rights of PCC in the state. To resolve the
foregoing issues, I propose the following language:
Child Conceived After the Death of a Parent
A child of the decedent conceived and born after the death
of the decedent shall be deemed a child of the decedent if:
(a) either:
(1) the individual consented in a record to the use of his or
her genetic material to posthumously conceive a child by assisted
reproduction; or
(2) the individual’s intent to conceive a child by assisted
reproduction after the individual’s death is established by clear
and convincing evidence; and
(b) the embryo is in utero no later than thirty-six (36) months
after the individual’s death.
(c) The person designated by the decedent to control the
decedent’s genetic material should give written notice within six
(6) months of the decedent’s death to the person with the power
to control the distribution of either the decedent’s property or
death benefits payable upon the decedent’s death of the
possibility of using decedent’s genetic material for posthumous
conception. The failure to provide timely notice relieves any
fiduciary or other person in control of the decedent’s property or
death benefits of liability for distributing the decedent’s property
or benefits to the proper beneficiaries at the end of the six (6)
month notice period. In the event that notice of intent to use the
decedent’s genetic material for posthumous conception is given
after six (6) months, the fiduciary of the decedent’s estate has the
duty to retain any remaining assets of the estate to which the
potential child may have valid claim until the end of the three (3)
year time period for posthumous conception.
(d) Unless of an agreement to the contrary, the decedent’s
consent to posthumous conception with a spouse is automatically
revoked upon the divorce of the parties.
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This proposed statutory language serves to resolve the issues
in the current statute by providing lucidity and increasing
flexibility. First, the consent requirement is simplified and allows
PCC to inherit even in the absence of a formal signed writing.
Second, the time limitation of three years provides clarity and
additional time for a surviving parent to grieve and consider
posthumous reproduction. Third, the proposed statute includes a
notice requirement to protect the child’s interests in the deceased
parent’s estate and allow for timely estate administration. Fourth,
the suggested language makes it clear that the statute applies to
all PCC regardless of the parent’s marital status or sex. Lastly,
this proposed statute is mindful of the best interests of the child.
By relaxing the restrictive consent requirement and time
limitations, it provides greater opportunity for PCC to inherit
despite their parents’ nontraditional reproductive choices.
CONCLUSION
The advancements in medical technology have altered the
traditional timelines of human reproduction. Although many
states have failed to update existing intestacy laws to provide
inheritance rights to PCC, Arkansas allows these children to
become rightful heirs. However, the Arkansas statute governing
PCC presents a number of issues that the legislature must address.
First, the consent provision presents practical and legal
difficulties because of its ambiguous language and ostensible
requirement to seek out medical professionals in order to provide
legal consent. Second, the plain language of the statute itself is
conflicting, and the time limitation is overly restrictive to the
surviving parent. Third, the statute lacks any stipulation to give
notice to the fiduciary of the decedent’s estate of the possibility
of posthumous conception. Finally, the language of the statute
appears to apply only to married parents.
To resolve these deficiencies, the Arkansas Legislature
should amend the current statute in a number of ways. First, the
consent requirement should be revised to require the decedent to
provide consent in a record or allow consent to be establish by
clear and convincing evidence, with divorce automatically
revoking prior consent to posthumously conceive. Second, the
conflicting language of the statute that allows a posthumously

660

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 72:3

conceived child to fulfill part of the time limitation and yet fail to
meet the time requirement for birth must be resolved. This should
be accomplished by extending the time limitation to conceive to
within three years of the deceased parent’s death. Third, a
surviving parent of the posthumously conceived child should be
required to provide notice within six months to a fiduciary or
custodian managing the decedent’s assets that posthumous
conception is a possibility. However, this procedural element
should not serve to bar a child from inheriting if the surviving
parent fails to give notice to the fiduciary of the decedent’s estate.
Finally, the statutory language should omit the term “spouse” to
allow it to apply equally to PCC born to married and unmarried
parents. These changes will allow for the timely administration
of estates while providing clarity for PCC’s inheritance rights and
flexibility for those who wish to posthumously conceive a child
in Arkansas.

